

Separation of East Pakistan:

Public Policy and Governance Issues

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Abstract

East Pakistan's separation is both a complex and sensitive, and the sensitivity adds to the complexity. Whether and to what extent the governance and public policy contributed to the separation was the main question for this study. Both appear different and distinct, but the link appears pronounced as one starts disentangling the complexity. The main link between governance and separation has two sub-links: policy and politics and politics and violence. Both are products of public policies. The separatist movement did not sprout suddenly and out of nowhere. It took over two decades to make and evolve through various stages: assertiveness, disillusionment, deprivation, alienation, vacuum, and mobilization. Each stage was the product of a set of public policies.

The starting point was an unstable hybrid governance model under an Administrative State. The administrative state responded the assertiveness on political and social fronts, with maneuvering and indifference. Language and culture were the main drivers of Bengali identity and were immediately threatened in the name of national integration. Economic and fiscal policies started shaping up too. The investments, public sector expenditures and trade policies became more and more skewed and the efforts at provincial autonomy were blocked with the creation of one-unit.

The administrative State gave way to an Authoritarian State under Martial law (1958) with developmental governance, which was characterized by centralization, non-participation and foreign inflows. East Pakistan faced a vacuum in which grievances, deprivation and alienation took root and emerged as political mobilization as soon as the Authoritarian State

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weakened in 1968-69. Thus enters the third stage and the link between politics and violence. Political mobilization based on the grievance, deprivation and frustration borne out of public policies exhibited itself in protests and the ballot box, giving an overwhelming mandate to carve out a new state, governance, and public policy apparatus.

The emergency state had only one answer to violence: more violence, which was a consequence of a lethal combination of fear, suspicion, and conspiracy. This is the phase that has been studied and discourse without going into the journey to separation shaped by the governance and public policies.

Keywords: *East Pakistan, Awami League, legal framework order, National Awami Party, Planning Commission.*

1. Introduction

The study aims to bridge a gap between two sides of the river which flow together but seldom meet; the governance, policy, and administration on one side and populism, nationalism and resistance on the other. Yet these two met in 1971, and the result was the breakup of Pakistan, defeat at the hands of the arch enemy, human carnage, and suffering. The study explores the tragedy of two decades of making thoughts and products of state policies and governance.

To establish any possible link between the policies and governance and the separation movement, one must move beyond the popular explanations. The most popular is the military explanation, which focuses on the War with India. Linked with the security explanation is the geo-strategic explanation and the role of foreign powers. The Indo-Russia Defense Pact and the Suspicious Role of US Leadership during the Crisis This line of inquiry assumes that if we had better military capacity and a neutral or neutralized India (through US/China support), we would have prevailed. But prevailed at what? The answer is not clear.

The other most common explanation is politics, which focuses on the politics of three main actors, Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto and their inflexible positions. What it conveniently ignores is how these inflexible positions (like Six points) were formed in the first place. The social explanation is linked with political reasons. The political divide widened because Bengalis were under Hindus' influence. Economic explanation does feature in academic circles, which originally emanated from the Bangladeshi academia, and merits the most serious consideration for two reasons: the separation movement was raised on economic factors, and counter-factual can be better analyzed in terms of economic policy.

Fait accompli is another popular and unfortunate explanation. East and West



Pakistan had nothing in common. The culture, way of life, identity and politics were poles apart, and to top that, a united Pakistan was a geographical absurdity (Mustafa & Nawaz, 2014). This had to happen sooner or later, so be it, is the common response.

The point being missed in all these explanations is that of alienation and resistance which had origins in the governance and public policy and the fact that East Pakistan was worse off in every the possible way in comparison to West Pakistan. If it were fait accompli, it need not have been so tragic, leaving the province in blood. The tragedy is not just the separation but also the way it unfolded.

It may be noted that the impact of governance structure and public policies on the East Pakistan separation movement has not been discussed. Economic policies like industrial, investment, trade and fiscal policies have been thoroughly analyzed for their impact. This paper will attempt to fill this research gap and will endeavor to trace the roots of policies and their impact on the politics ultimately resulting in the separation of East Pakistan.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

The monumental event of East Pakistan's separation and the ensuing debates have been a constant source of discussion and controversy with reference to political, security and sociological perspectives. However, the public policy and governance factors, which are pivotal to the functioning of any State, have not been explored in the context of alienation, which led to the ultimate breakup of the country. How public policy choices precipitated this alienation and whether the separation could have been prevented with a different set of public policy choices are the questions that have a bearing on the future governance priorities for the country. Further, how do Policies affect politics and how the politics turned violent, leading to ultimate separation? The study will identify then prevalent policy and governance models, analyze their impact on the politics, society and economy and explore the link of policies with the separation movement.

1.2. Research Questions

- How did the Governance and Public policy contribute to the separation of East Pakistan?
- How did policy choices result in affecting and changing the course of Politics, and how the politics turned into political violence and rebellion?
- Why East Pakistan moved from leading the independence movement to disillusionment and alienation and then onwards to resistance and

separation in just two decades?

- Why different set of policy choices were available but not conceived and implemented? And how different set of policies could have had different consequences?

2. Review of the Literature

The literature has been divided into three categories or boxes in line with study's framework. The first is policy and governance model, second is the impact of these policies in creating the political mobilization and finally the separation and resistance. The literature has been more concentrated in first and third category with few overlapping themes. The task was made challenging due to partisan nature of works produced in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. These have been corroborated with works by independent experts.

The Policy and Governance features Guthrie Birkhead's edited volume on Administrative Problems of Pakistan with essays by Ziring, Miller and Platt (Birkhead, 1966). Former Civil Servant Hasan Zaheer's award-winning book "The Separation of East Pakistan" (Zaheer, 1994) provides important glimpses of governance and valuable data. Economist Rashid Amjad's Ph.D. thesis and later book on Industrial policy (Amjad, 1982) and SOAS Professor Mushtaq Khan's work on the Political Economy of Industrial Policy (Khan M. H., 2000) serve as the foundation of analysis. Rizwn Kokab's Ph.D. thesis (and book) on the leadership perspective remains descriptive but did provide important data on administration (Kokab, 2017).

The politics side is covered and most notably by Lawrence Ziring chronicling the Ayub Khan era (ziring, 1971) followed by historian Rushbrook Williams short but important work on the East Pakistan tragedy (Williams, 1972). The works by Journalists Herbert Feldman and William Milam provides important neutral insights (Feldman, 1975) (Milam, 2009). The most recent works have been either concerned on people's history (Zakaria, 2023) or verifying and rejecting claims of atrocities (bose, 2011).

Hamood-u-Rehman Commission Report is the only official version from Pakistan (Hamood-u-Rehman, 1972) and stops woefully short on analysis of factors leading to tragedy and just restricts the conduct of military officers. Amongst academics, Dr Safadr Memood (mehmood, 2003), Ayesha Jalal (Jalal, 2014). and Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi (Rizvi, 2000) touched the topic partly in their works, Khwaja Alqama provides a deep and nuanced perspective with reference to debate between development and ethnicity as the main source of fissure (Alqama, 1997).

Similarly, almost all the concerned senior military officers offered apologetic and passionate accounts, shifting blame on others or on the enemy. Siddiq Salik



(Salik, 1997) and AO Mitha provides some objectivity but the other works (Maj Gens Fazal Mueqem, Khadim Raja, Sher Ali Pataudi Brig Karar Agha) (Agha, 2011) (Farman, 1992) (Fazal-Mueqem, 1973) (Raja, 2012) are repetitive, anecdotal and lack both depth and objectivity Even Lt Gen AAK Niazi came up with his version in his book predictably titled *The Betrayal of East Pakistan* (Niazi, 1998).

The literature from Bangladesh can be divided into political and economic categories. Political literature is led and defined by the unfinished memoirs of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Rahman, 2012). S. Mahmud Ali's *Understanding Bangladesh* is a more balanced primer (Ali S.

M., 2010). Academic and former activist Badruddin Umar's work provides useful chronicles and the extent of deprivation (Umar, 2004). The economic literature which has been consulted is both recent and old. Earlier work of Rahman Sobhan, who was the earliest proponent of two economic theses and later advisor of Mujib (Sobhan, 1962).

Policy and administration were distinctly applied in the 1950s and 60s, with the "the policy process" credited to Harold Lasswell (Lasswell, 1956). The definition and process of governance (which is a new field) have been taken from (Fukuyama, 2013) and the governance index (World Bank, 2017). E.E Schattschneider's famous "a new policy creates a new politics" (Kellow, 2015) is the theoretical anchor. The policy feedback theory (Weible & Sabatier, 2018) based on Pierson's seminal paper "When Effect is Cause" further anchors policies in institutionalism and provides a model for the very specific research question: how do Policies, once created, reshape Politics? (Pierson, 1993). Dr Ishrat Hussain has been referred with respect to his take on governance (Hussain D. I., 2018). The literature takes governance as a strong institution and is unanimous on the link between institutions of governance and economic performance. The study of institutions comes from the Institutional economics (North, 1990).

The third box of inquiry for the present study is that of political violence. Davies (1962) argues in "Towards a Theory of Revolution" that revolution occurs when a period of prosperity is followed by a short period of reversal of rewards (Davies, 1962). The other classic, "Why Men Rebel?", postulates the role of "Relative Deprivation" in creating the spirit of rebellion (Gurr, 1970). The East Pakistan case study will be analyzed according to these and other models of Political violence.

3. Research Methodology

The paper follows an exploratory approach to qualitative research based on secondary sources. The analysis of policies and their link with the separation movement has been established by collecting and collating secondary data

from official sources. The twin links between policies and politics and between politics and separation have been established using the political economy, sectoral and institutional policy analysis

4. Section I: Administrative State

4.1. Framing of Issues and Concepts

The term governance is a recent phenomenon and gained popularity mostly post-1990. The term most popular post-1945 was Administration, which was mostly covered in literature (Birkland, 2010). This paper takes the governance and administration distinctly, with governance at the system or policy-making level and administration at the implementation level. Policies feature between governance and administration with a focus on the respective sectors like economic, social, and administrative for the purpose of this study. State, governance, policy and administration are the four tiers used in this paper.

Policy studies are credited to Lasswell, who is considered a pioneer of policy studies and introduced the term 'decision process'. He proposed seven functions (not phases): intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, and termination (Lasswell, 1956). Later, in one of the first books on Policy Process, Charles Jones converted the seven critical activities into "policy cycles", which became the prevalent terminology. However, the policy research is moving towards more causal implications instead of just process (Weible & Sabatier, 2018).

Francis Fukuyama has come up with a succinct and over-arching definition of governance as "Government's ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services regardless of whether the government is democratic or not" (Fukuyama, 2013). The democracy explanation has significant relevance for Pakistan for being under the authoritarian regime during the period under review. Dr Ishrat Hussain (Hussain D. I., 2018) admits to having no definite definition and relies on the World Bank as a 'process through which state and non-state actors interact to design and implement policies within a set of formal and informal rules that shape and are shaped by power' (World-Bank, 2017). Power has been further defined as "the ability of groups and individuals to make others act in their interest and to bring about specific outcomes". Though the definitions are recent, the study takes Governance as both a system and process of making and implementing policies.

Policy or public policy (the distinction is important for this study) "involves the decisions (including both actions and non-action) of a government or an equivalent authority" (Birkland, 2010). Public policies include but are not limited to laws, regulations, executive decisions, and government programs. Elinor Ostrom explains public policy as the "identification of the institutions that explain its design and content" (Ostrom, 1980). The term institutions cross-



cuts the governance, administration and policy and has been defined authoritatively by Nobel Prize Winning Economist Douglass C North (North, 1990) “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions and include the laws, rules and norms constructed to advance and preserve social order”.

How do Policies affect politics? E.E Schattschneider famously observed in 1935 “a new policy creates a new politics” (Kellow, 2015). Schattschneider also presciently included in-action as the policy, which later featured in definitions of policy. The policy feedback theory (Mattler & Sorrelle, 2014) based on Pierson’s counter-intuitive approach, explores policies impact on politics. According to Pierson, ‘major public policies constitute rules of the game, and these institutions influence the allocation of economic and political resource, modifying the costs and benefits associated with alternative political strategies, and consequently altering ensuing political development’ (Pierson, 1993). The theory coincides with the case study of political developments due to certain policies.

4.2. Situation Overview (1947-158): Administrative State & Unstable Hybrid Governance

Pakistan, as a post-colonial state, started off as an administrative state beset with crises. The crises were four-fold: economic, administrative, security and constitutional. The economic crisis was manifested more in the refugee crisis accompanied by the exodus of economic apparatus. The areas that constituted Pakistan were agrarian, and most of the commercial and industrial assets (Zaheer, 1994) were in India.

Security issues dominated the country from the initial days of hostilities in Kashmir and gave rise to the primacy of the military in civilian affairs, the consequences of which were far-reaching and lasting. The constitutional crisis overshadowed the other crises and was aggravated by the untimely and early passing of the father of the nation. It took eight years for the country to have a constitution, which lasted just two and a half years.

East Pakistan did not figure much in crises except for the last one. The refugee movement was not significant, and the division united Bengal was relatively peaceful one (Collins & Lapierre, 1997). Economic and administrative issues were also concentrated in the provinces of the west wing which convinced the ruling classes to self-righteously and narrowly believe in a) a strong central government, b) Urdu as a symbol of unity and Islamic ideology, c) Bengali opposition as subversive, d) developing defence forces in West for the sake of East (Zaheer, 1994).

Constitutional priorities and provincial autonomy mattered most to the Bengali citizens and constitution making is where they were most disappointed.

Provincial autonomy was their initial and original demand but the constitutional crisis led to parity, which simply meant thwarting the possibility of East Bengal led majority government. The invention of parity was a tacit recognition that a0. East Bengal will invariably produce a majority; b. the majority will always ask for provincial autonomy and c. the provincial autonomy will be to the detriment of the west. Parity thus became a hegemonic instrument without going into the causes of the demand for autonomy, like disillusionment, de-politicization, and bureaucratization.

The government in Karachi was just called a Center, not a union (as in India) or a Federation (as Pakistan chose to become later). The harmless nomenclature reflects the understanding (or lack thereof) of the new country's administration, which had scant regard for the nuances and complexities of a federation. The leadership (both political & bureaucratic) had no experience of the "economic and social strains of the federal system". It carried on with the model of centralized model of governance (Zaheer, 1994).

On the other hand, right from the victory of the United Front in 1953 (and ensuing resistance to their right) in provincial elections and the elimination of the Muslim league from East Pakistan, the politics in East Pakistan from there on was defined by the question of autonomy and equality. Awami Muslim League, which was the leading party in the 1954 & 1955 provincial elections, soon dropped 'Muslim' from its name and put forward a 21-point program for provincial autonomy (Rehman, 2012). The assembly, even in 1957, passed a resolution for provincial autonomy and left only three subjects to the central government (Mastoor, 2015).

Hassan Zaheer makes a much-nuanced distinction between the idea of Pakistan for Muslims of north India who, under the influence of Aligarh, were moved by the Muslim Renaissance while the Bengali Muslims were more concerned for economic emancipation from Hindus and provincial autonomy (Zaheer, 1994). This distinction had a significant impact on the new state. Bengalis had a long history of struggle for rights and had vibrant student politics, which produced Mujib u Rehman and almost the entire leadership of the Awami League.

The debate on nationhood is beyond the scope of this paper but some reference would be useful as the governance flows from the state, and nation and state are intertwined. In the view of most academics, including Dr Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan lacked the usual bonds that form and forge a nation like language, culture, and social networks (Mehmood, 1989). Sh Mujibur Rehman, in his memoirs, also narrates about anti-Bengali sentiment during his visit to Civil Services Academy as early in 1949 (Rahman, 2012).

Nationhood was assumed instead of any effort to create it, and even efforts like the imposition of Urdu as the national language immediately attracted a severe



backlash. Why the religion could not be the bond between the two wings is also a significant question which merits separate discussion. The difference in population density with East Pakistan having 930 per sq mile and the western wing with 140 per sq mile, also played a significant role in the social, political, and economic factors (Sobhan, 1962)

4.3. Unstable Hybrid Governance: Bureaucratization, Praetorianism & Lack of Consensus

This paper proposes the governance model in the early 50s to be an unstable hybrid; politicians, bureaucrats and the military were bound together in the hybrid model, which continued to be unstable and was marred by a lack of consensus. Primarily, bureaucrats and the military were part of the same camp with Iskander Mirza's fusion of the two (Zaheer, 1994), though with divergent objectives and directions. The instability came mainly from bureaucrats trying to keep politicians under their tutelage (Sayeed, 1980). Politicians had the task of constitutional solutions, and bureaucrats with development and governance. The former failed and the later laid the foundation of failure.

The unstable hybrid model envisaged an administrative state instead of a representative federation or a union and was actively resistant to any notion of provincial autonomy. Ironically, West Pakistan's leadership considered the demand for provincial autonomy as a recipe for the dismemberment of the country (Cochrane, 2009) not realizing that the country would be dismembered not by provincial autonomy but by lack thereof. Their thinking can be said to be colonial, but their colonial ambitions did not match the colonial capacity or resources.

The post-colonial governance took a curious driver's seat from being autonomous to independent. The post-colonial bureaucracy failed to appreciate the difference between administration, which required autonomy, and governance, which required participation. Administration is about implementation, governance is about policy, administration is about the process, and governance is about the people. Therefore, administration must be autonomous and neutral; governance has to be political and independent. They tried to govern through administration and did not have the foresight to see the consequences.

Bureaucrats in Pakistan became or were found to be both autonomous and independent implementers and makers of policy. They also found ways to undermine or even intimidate the politicians, who were inexperienced and ill-organized to control "over-mighty" civil service (Ziring, 1971). They, however, could not take formal driving seats because they lacked legitimacy. The result was an unstable hybrid in which the military was also brought in to fill in the power vacuum. One can also argue that military intervention had both pull

and push factors. Bureaucrats found their support valuable to tame the politicians and they themselves developed the praetorian tendencies.

4.4. Administrative Policy

Administration has been defined “as the process by which an organisation’s (in this case, governmental) policies are implemented and organizational goals are sought” (Birkhead, 1966). Birkhead was one of the imported administrative experts sent to Pakistan. He termed the need to shift from a colonial, law, and order mentality to a democratic growth mentality as banal. He was wholeheartedly *sold* to the idea of the 1958 revolution, i.e. military coup.

From day one, the administration became the state's gatekeepers and positioned themselves as checkpoints on all major activities (Goodnow, 1964). Goodnow, who authored the first book on the civil service of Pakistan while acknowledging the capacity of CSP, finds them all powerful and non-accountable because “To protect competence, responsiveness was sacrificed”. The administrators became policy givers instead of the implementers, contravening the tenets of effective governance. After defining governance, Fukuyama further argues that “No bureaucracy has the authority to define its own mandates, regardless of whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian (Fukuyama, 2013)”. Pakistan’s bureaucracy did just that and went into the business of policy making creating the unstable hybrid governance model.

Since most of the economic and policy activities were based in the west wing, the elite administrators, i.e. CSPs, preferred to stay in west Pakistan, and the inter-wing transfer policy could be enforced only once (Zaheer, 1994). The administration consists of human resources, structure, and processes. The condition of the human resources in governance and policy gives a clear picture of West Pakistan's dominance (Talbot, 2002). The 1955 figures show a clear division. Armed forces were said to be 85 % from Punjab owing to colonial legacy (Khan A., 2005), but the discrimination in administration had no justification.

Table 1.
Armed forces division

Central Secretariat	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	Armed Forces	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Secretary	0	19	Lt Gen/ Maj Gen / Brig	0/0/1	3/20/34
Joint Secretary	3	38	Lt Col/ Col/Major	1/2/10	198/590/593



Central Secretariat	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	Armed Forces	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Deputy Secretary	10	123	Naval	7	593
Under Secretary	38	510	Naval/PAF	40	640

4.5. Economic Policy; Industrial, Agri, Fiscal & Trade Policies

When the bureaucrats and military were straightening the reins to run the new country, East Pakistan was exercising and asserting its democratic powers. East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950 and East Bengal Transfer of Agriculture Land Act 1950 led to changing the hinterland status and removing the domination of Hindus (Zaheer, 1994). Ironically, the West-Pakistan leadership always accused the Bengalis of collusion with Hindus. Actually, they started off by granting the tenants' rights against the Hindu landholders. In fact, the progressive's biggest criticism of the later BD system was the collusion of zamindar-hindu mahajins (landowner-moneylender) (Umar, 2004),

Both the wings started off with dependence on Agriculture. In terms of industrial development, there was little difference, with the East Wing ahead in textiles and tea and the West having the edge in metals and sugar (Sobhan, 1962). The most serious differences started to appear with higher aggregate investments (both public and private) being diverted to the western provinces.

East Pakistan started agitating as early as 1951-52 about the revenue autonomy because of deficit budgets while the central government was running surpluses (Zaheer, 1994). The credit policy was also heavily skewed in favor of West Pakistan through the PIDC, which was established in 1951 and created industrial conglomerates in the East with head officers in the West (Hussain A., 1979)

The trade balance was also heavily in favour of the West. East Pakistan contributed to 50-60% of total exports while importing around 30 % of the total. The trade deficit of West Pakistan was constantly financed by the East from 1947 to 1958. (Gull, 2015). The currency was kept over-valued to support the imports, which benefited the West wing to the extent of over-valuation hovered around 120 percent (Qasir, 1991). The exporter's dollar price remained at 4.25 during 1951-1964 while the importers were paying 8.61, thus depriving the exporters of their due benefits and putting undue strain on the exchange rate

managed only through the surplus from the East (Ali T., 1970).

The per-capita availability of selected commodities in the two wings would be an apt indicator to understand the effects of economic policies in the first decade (Khan S., 1961)

Table 2.

APT indicator to understand the effects of economic policies

Commodity	West Pakistan 1951-52	East Pakistan 1951-52	West Pakistan 1959-1960	East Pakistan 1959-1960
Wheat	9.9	0.1	10	0.4
Rice	1.4	14.7	1.7	16.0
Sugar	32.7	15.7	50.3	13.3
Fish	2.4	3.9	3.5	9.3
Cloth	1.4	1.7	9.0	3.0
Electricity	8.6	0.5	28.8	1.6

4.6. Social Policy

Policy Feedback Theory (Pierson, 1993), which explores policy's effect on politics, provides citizenship as the first part of political identity affected by policies (Mattler & Sorrelle, 2014). Citizenship is expressed as status and standing. Another concept for this study is belonging. Citizens should feel that they belong to a state. The language and representation were basic symbols of belonging, and Bengalis were deprived of both, which proved disastrous for national integration.

Quaid-e-Azam envisaged that intangible faith would hold the country together with social justice and equity principles. Sadly, the same could not figure in the policy preference, and the glaring diversity in the country was left on the backburner (Mastoor, 2015). Social policy, since the early days, was defined by the culture and policy on language. Bengalis, in theory and practice, always made a clear distinction between religions and culture (Talbot, 1999)

Unfortunately, the situation took a misdirected turn from the statement by Quaid-e-Azam (Zaheer, 1994) in Bengal about Urdu being the official language.



His exhortation to “give up provincialism” was predicated on the representation of people in the centre, which did not turn out to be the case.

4.6.1. Policy Impact: Assertiveness, Disillusionment & Awakening

The economic divide was seen to be widening with a number of tell-tale signs. Mahbub ul Haq, the renowned economist, revealed in his “Strategy of Economic Planning” in 1962 that the level of investment-saving ratio in the West was higher in the West because of transfer from abroad and East, leading to compulsory transfer of savings to the West wing. In a rather revealing analysis, he predicted that even if the government resources were equally distributed, the 4-5 of income would be transferred to the West annually (Gull, 2015).

The inherent problems of differences in culture distance and economic status did not figure in the policy and governance. National integration did not seem to be a priority, and both wings went their own way, evolving in their peculiar ways. Few Bengali students would come to study or work across the western border. A small number of farmers were settled in Sindh under the Thall Development Authority but the initiative could not be repeated on a significant scale (Sobhan, 1962).

Bengalis were being awakened around that time. Mujib was a minion of a politician, but he had found the new issues, and the Bengalis' assertiveness matched the administrative state's cost through language riots, election victory and economic actions. The source of all the awakening was different, too, and moving from farms to classrooms to assembly. However, the awakening went unnoticed by the West-Pakistan elite, who were fixated on instability as the main problem. The creation of one Unit matched the assertiveness in 1956

The Constitution was not enough for the military-bureaucratic governance system. The only way left to deal with instability was Martial law.

5. Section II: Authoritarian State & Developmental Governance

5.1. Situation Overview (1958-69) –Authoritarian State

Ayub Khan, the sole ruler and later the law-giver, was fixated on the perils of “unfettered democracy” and favoured *controlled democracy* with checks and counterchecks (Khan A. , 1967). Under what has been called as “great leader syndrome” (ziring, 1971), he envisaged a Unitary-Centralised-Authoritarian-Developmental State. He also had special disdain reserved for the Bengalis, whom he considered as “millstone around our neck” and as backward people who did not want to work, were interested in political issues and were a special burden for Pakistan (Alqama, 1997) (Hussain S. S., 2010). As per the Bengali academic version, no surprise that his special disdain for provincial autonomy

and rights of Bengali “contributed towards the hastening of disintegration of Pakistan (Umar, 2004).

The 1962 constitution, in principles of policy, promised that “parity between the provinces in all spheres of the central government should, as nearly as practicable, be achieved” (Constitution, 1962). The one-unit scheme created a false sense of unity in West Pakistan and a real sense of alienation in the Eastern wing. The second five year plan also acknowledged regional disparity but did not make any definite commitment to address it (Sobhan, 1962). The seeds of alienation and dissatisfaction sowed in the 50s were now budding plants. Anyone with prescience could see, and many did, but not those who should have.

5.1.1. Developmental Governance: Centralization, Non-Participation & Out-sourcing

The developmental governance model was defined by three characteristics: over-centralized (Jaffrelot), remote-controlled, and out-sourced. Since the regime was fixated on stability and Monem Khan remained the longest serving Governor (1962-69) who exuded sentiments like “having ruled East Pakistan with a ruthless hand, carrying out the grotesque autocratic policies on behalf of Ayub Khan” (Ahmed, 2004) preferred over Ayub’s own more popular and inclusive martial law administrator General Azam Khan (Chaudhary K. , 2012). Known to be communal, regressive and anti-culture, he took unpopular steps like banning Tegure from the media (later withdrawn) and generally contributed to the unpopularity of the entire regime (Umar, 2004).

The 1965 War proved to be a pivotal event for cementing the Bengali alienation directly and indirectly. The direct factor was the realization of the vulnerability of their defence in the face of Indian attack, and the indirect factor was the timing and diversion of resources. The third five year plan promised a better share of resources to East Pakistan, which could not be realized due to War, the foreign assistance declined from 6 to 3 % of GDP, and the defence expenditure rose from 2.2 % (1964-65) to 4 % (1969-70) (Aziz, 2009). Sartaj Aziz confirms that the political issues combined with economic difficulties provided momentum to the *civil disobedience movement* in East Pakistan.

5.2. Administrative Policy

The administrative policy flowed from one person and in the words of Dr Safdar Mehmood, Ayub Khan was solely responsible for the country’s administration. The 1962 Constitution was as much civilian in that it included a clause declaring the Minister of Defence for the next 20 years would be from the military (Nawaz, 2008). His governor for East Pakistan, Monem Khan, reversed the policy of reconciliation and moderation, using the administration merely as a tool of oppression (Jahan, 1972). The disparity in armed forced



recruitment and deployment was the subject of intense debate in the parliament, who considered themselves vulnerable. Their repeated demand of having Naval HQs in Chittagong was not heeded (Umar, 2004).

5.3. Economic Policy

Economic policy was claimed as the major success story, and the pessimists who thought Pakistan was not economically viable were really surprised by what was then termed as the success of economic policy. Bengalis claim to contribute 60 % while getting 25 % of the expenditures (Salik, 1997), though the figure would be contested.

The economic policy was the rule by corporations following the goals set by the Planning Commission under the President who also held sway in budget making. East Pakistan Planning Board, which was responsible for making development policy for the wing, was abolished (Talbot, 2002). Fifty per cent of the developmental expenditures in even the third five Year plan (following the earlier trends) was dedicated to corporations like PICIC, PIDC, WAPDA and PIA (Birkhead, 1966). PICIC only provided 22 % of loans to East Pakistan during 1961-62 to 1966-67 (Papanrk, 1967). Defence consumed most of the budget, with 60.69 per cent of its expenditures allocated (Rizvi, 2000)

Centralised planning was termed successful by the implementation standards and, as per the progress report submitted by Harvard Advisory Group called the economic indicators 'quite a performance' (Harvard, 1964). The counter voices were also coming from the economists from East Pakistan who were arguing that industries and investment made no economic sense and the growth was a result of Myrdal's law of cumulative causation- faster growing reason attracts more investments (Sobhan, 1962).

5.4. Social Policy

Education was the sector in which East Pakistanis suffered the most and the fact was not lost on Awami League that since 1947 number of primary schools had decreased instead of increasing. The number of literates were more in West Pakistan (1.7 million) than East Pakistan (1.4 mil) despite the latter being more populous.

Table 3.

Literacy rate

Years	Schools- EP Primary	Schools- WP Primary	Schools-EP Secondary	Schools-WP Secondary	EP Graduates	WP Graduates
1947/48	29,633	8,413	3481	2598	41,480	44,000

Years	Schools- EP Primary	Schools- WP Primary	Schools-EP Secondary	Schools-WP Secondary	EP Graduates	WP Graduates
1955	26,000	14,162	3079	2264	NA	NA
1960	26,583	17,901	3053	3043	=	=
1965	27,474	32,589	3843	4323	=	=
1969/70	28,908	38,900	5694	5600	28,070	54,000

Source: Asadullah, 2006; Umar, 2004 Economic Divide

Table 4.
Per Capita Income

Years	Pop Growth EP	Population Growth WP	East Pakistan GPP (Crores)	West Pakistan GPP	East Pakistan Per Capita Income	West Pakistan Per Capita Income
1949-50	1.97	1.96	1237.4	1209.1	293	342
1954-55	2.25	2.18			290	354
1959-60	2.51-**	2.32	1497.2	1646.7	278	366
1964-65	2.56	2.44	1867.1	2009.0	301	443
1969-70	2.57	2.55			321	546

Source: Khan & Bergen, 1966; Dasgupta, 1971

We must see if the economic policies contributed to the economic divide and whether developmental authoritarian regime defined success the wrong way.

Table 5.
Expenditures

	EP Revenue Expenditure	WP Revenue Expenditure	EP Development Expenditure	West Pakistan Development Expenditure	EP Total Expenditure	WP Total Expenditure
1950- 1955	171	720	100	400	271	1120
					20 %	80 %
1955-	254	898	270	757	524	1655



Separation of East Pakistan

	EP Revenue Expenditure	WP Revenue Expenditure	EP Development Expenditure	West Pakistan Development Expenditure	EP Total Expenditure	WP Total Expenditure
1960					26 %	76%
1960- 1965	434	1284	270	2071	1404	3355
					32 %	68 %
1965- 1970	648	2223	1655	2970	2304	5193
					36 %	64 %

Source: Gull, 2015.

Fiscal imbalances were considered the most polarizing. Mujib, in his first televised speech (allowed by the regime), came up with some telling numbers of the fiscal imbalance during 1950- 1970 (Umar, 2004). The figures on the face appear unreliable and exaggerated but the point is their resonance and acceptance.

Table 6.
Fiscal imbalances

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Revenue Expenditures	1500	5000
Development Expenditures	3060	6000
Imports	1000	3000
Foreign Exchange Earnings	1500	1300
Foreign Aid	20 %	80 %

The higher level of development and non-development expenditures in West Pakistan, supported by the fiscal and commercial policies conceived in the 1950s and consolidated in the 1960s, resulted in a thriving private sector in West Pakistan while leaving East Pakistan totally neglected (Alqama, 1997). East Pakistan bore the burden as its growth declined to 4 per cent, while West Pakistan still grew around 6.4 % with 75 per cent of private investment during 1965-1970 (Nawaz, 2008). Industrialization benefits largely escaped the Bengali elite as there was hardly any indigenous enterprise and the industries set up in the eastern wing were dominated by western capitalists (Shrikhande, 1973).

5.4.1. Policy Impact: Exclusion, Vacuum and Alienation

Ayub era advocates claim a lot of good in East Pakistan, ranging from the construction of new assembly buildings to agricultural development under a third five year plan. However, the major reason for alienation under Ayub was the misplaced notion of the development and utter ignorance of politics, in short not appreciating the significance of political economy. The tradeoff between autonomy and development did not work especially when the development was also unequal. There was little dissent though. The Fifties, vocalism, and dissent, arose from hope and confidence for being equal citizens. The sixties saw the exclusion and resulted in a vacuum. The vacuum persisted in the center and the center could not become a federation. The basic democratic system did provide two temporary important impetus; economic and social but the missed the most crucial ones, the political and governance.

The issues for East Pakistan were twofold though; the development was patronizing and the non-participatory. Ziring quotes a forgotten finance commission document advocating a massive curtailment in expenditures for West Pakistan if any balance was to be attained. Rahman Sobhan, writing under the Government's own PIDE, quotes the findings of this finance commission, which advised the elimination of regional disparity to be an objective of national policy and cautiously hopes that the National Economic Council will take up the objective (Sobhan, 1962), though it never did.

Ayub's doctrine of "functional inequality" was conscious and intentional to concentrate capital in a few hands that all happened to be from West Pakistan and that to the elite (Gull, 2015). The

trickle down scheme had many takers, and even the esteemed Mabhul ul Haq called the focus on the social sector a luxury and advocated for growth oriented governance (Umar, 2004). Bengali elite's alienation was further aggravated by the fact the Ayub era development was passed by them (Talbot, Pakistan a Modern History, 1999). The public sector development expenditures, as per the official estimates, were at par by 1964 (Nawaz, 2008), but so many resources were pumped into the West like foreign aid, Indus basin development and the social sector development schemes.

The vacuum lasted till 1967/68 but then Six Points became an alternative to fill the vacuum and provided both the *raison-de-tre* and direction to the Bengali nationalism. It might be instructive to look at the words of six points whose genesis was more in policy than in politics. Six Points (Mastoor, 2015) were first presented in the meeting of opposition parties in Lahore on 05 Feb 1966 in Lahore and became the charter of the separatist movement (Rehman, 2012). The six points underwent changes too, and each had a distinct policy focus:



Table 7.
The six points change

Points	Original Demand	Amended in AL Manifesto	Policy source
Point 1 Structure of State	Federation in the sense of Pakistan Resolution with Parliamentary Form of Govt	Federal and parliamentary with population as the basis of the franchise	Constitutional
Point 2 Federal-Units Relations	Only Two federal subjects: Defence and foreign affairs	Three subjects: Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Currency (subject to 3)	Economic
Point 3 Currency	Two separate freely convertible currencies with separate reserve banking and monetary policy	The single currency is subject to the regional federal reserve system; otherwise, the single currency	Economic
Point 4 Fiscal Policy	Fiscal and tax policy shall vest in Units & federation will have a Share in state taxes	Fiscal policy still with units with requisite revenue sources for the federation	Economic
Point 5 Foreign Trade & Exchange	Two separate foreign exchange accounts for foreign trade with the free flow of Indigenous products	Constitutional provisions for two separate foreign exchange accounts within the framework of foreign exchange policy	Economic
Point 6 Paramilitary	Setting up of a militia or paramilitary force for East Pakistan	Units will be empowered to maintain militia to contribute effectively to national security	Security

The alienation led to the “two economy-one countries’ model by the Bengali economists, which the six essential points propounded. They had concluded that within the country they must carve out two economics. The demand for the two economies was rooted in the consequence of trade, industrial, monetary, and fiscal policies that had been in practice since the 1950s but became institutionalized in the Ayub era.

Ayub era’s centralization brought hopelessness, which was initially answered intellectually. The economists did not harbor or visualize separatism or secession. Still, they saw the situation to be averse to the interests of the entire

Bengali population. They came up with a novel and bold notion of two economies. If the parity must be maintained, the economies of both wings had to be treated as two, not one. Economists did not have the means to enforce the idea, but it had taken root and became the foundation of separatism.

It would not be unreasonable to conclude that West Pakistan benefited more than East, but overall, the development model failed, on the socio-political front at least. The Gini Coefficient worsened, and the number of people below the poverty line increased (Hussain D. I., 2018). The index of real wages only marginally increased, and investment in the critical social sector remained poor, especially in East Pakistan, where the number of schools decreased.

6. Section 3: Emergency State –Crisis Governance

6.1. Situation Overview (1969-1971) – Emergency State

Ayub's ouster was demanded by the popular sentiment in both West and East, with the difference that in the West, the issue was the regime, and in the East, the issue was the new structure for the state. The final months of Ayub were marked by protests and rioting in both wings. Mujib, who was facing trial under the Agatala Conspiracy Case, had to be freed after life was paralyzed in East Pakistan during the Dec-March 1969 movement (Umar, 2004). The end of the Ayub era also marked the puncturing of the vacuum, and the alienation and exclusion gave rise to political resistance and mobilization. Not yet political violence, which was the work of the new state.

The new emergency State was MILITARISED-NON-REPRESENTATIVE & NON- PARTICIPATORY, which ironically envisaged a federal, parliamentary, and democratic structure through elections. Yahya era was defined by politics around six points, and the 1970 election was as per AL a referendum on six points. As per Asghar Khan, Mujib could not have abandoned them even if he wanted to do so (Khan A. , 2005). Ayesha Jalal aptly termed the six points a "firecracker in the tinderbox of disillusionments in Ayub's Pakistan" (Jalal, 2014). Yahya Khan, on the other hand, wondered innocently, when asked about the separatist movement in East Pakistan, "How can a majority separate from the minority?"

6.2. Crisis Governance – Consolidation, Conflict & Reaction

Yahya's regime started off with 'I am a soldier' approach (Nawaz, 2008) and was marked by consolidation and restoration of normalcy but his regime could not resolve the conflict arising out of 1970 elections and ultimately went into reaction mode.



6.3. Administrative Policy

of all administrative and political power in a close junta of armed forces officers who suffered from “glaring cases of moral lapses” (Hamood-u-Rehman, 1972). The cabinet and secretariat became one entity under the title Council of Administration. Politicians were already out, but the military –bureaucracy combination which was hallmark of Ayub era governance was also given a shock by sacking of 303 civil servants (Nawaz, 2008) and the military officers of Brigadier rank operated as super-secretaries (Umar, 2004). Yahya in his consolidation drive made six Bengali officers as central secretaries and quota in the armed forces was also doubled (Chaudhary G. , 1974) though by then it was too late. Civilian cabinet did replace the COA but the decision-making remained in the office of Yahya as Commander in Chief, CMLA and President. The arrangement could only continue till 1st March 1971 when again the cabinets were dissolved and military commanders were back as Governors.

The administrative policy in their indifference missed the historically deadliest Cyclone Bhola in December 1970 which caused death of about half a million people. The attitude by Yahya and his administration was callous and casual and further aggravated the situation (Nawaz, 2008). He just made a short stop over while coming from a four day tour of China and had just few words of advice for Governor Ahsan. His personal indifference and callousness made a lasting political impression and strengthened the separatist tendencies especially among the young (Umar, 2004).

The election on 07 December 1970 and overwhelming victory by AL sealed the fate of what was left of administration in East Pakistan which was in the words telegram sent by US diplomat in Dhaka, “already lame duck” (Umar, 2004). The governor and commander in East Pakistan proved to be as myopic as it can get and lived up to the ‘low calibre’ dubbed by one senior member of the junta (Zaheer, 1994).

The key to political violence was with the Bengali servicemen in armed forces and police. The failure of security policy was a foregone conclusion as the ‘operation searchlight’ (Umar, 2004) targeted police, militia and military units primarily. The sole exception was the Dhaka University. The crackdown on the armed and trained militia finally turned political protests into political violence and civil war.

6.4. Economic Policy

Yahya Khan did not have the room or option to institute a robust economic policy. Like everything else, his policies were too late and far too little in delivery. His unfulfilled fourth five year plan generously promised funds to East Pakistan (Chaudhary G. , 1974). One must be mindful that Chaudhry was one of the key advisors of Yahya and architect of LFO.

Table 8.
Unfulfilled fourth five year plan

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	Total (Crore Rs)
Public Sector	2940 (60 %)	1960 (40 %)	4,900
Private Sector	3000 (39 %)	1600 (61 %)	2,600
Total	5940 (52.5 %)	3560 (47.5 %)	7,500

Yahya regime also went on to announce the fourth five year plan despite the demands by political parties to postpone it till the new assembly. The level of detachment from reality was such that Secretary General MM Ahmad refused to change the contours of the fourth five year plan despite in the throes of the separatism movement (Zaheer, 1994).

6.4.1. Policy Impact: Representation, Resistance and Rebellion

Yahya Khan to his credit initially recognized the problem correctly as non-representative and non-participatory nature of the state (Shrikhande, 1973). His LFO was according to the political demands except for two important omissions which cost Pakistan dearly. One, creating a vacuum by abrogating the constitution altogether thus making six points a non-negotiable and second, not taking any broad consultation and not creating a bicameral legislature which could have provided cushion in divided polity like Pakistan (Aziz, 2009). He himself outlined the possibility of revival of 1956 Constitution which could have filled the vacuum created in Ayub era and exploited later on by Awami league.

The literature by both outsiders (Ziring, 1971) (Zaheer, 1994) (Umar, 2004) and insiders (Farman, 1992) indicates Yahya's intentions and efforts but lack of decisiveness. The cabal around him though shared the same disdain for the inhabitants of East Pakistan. "East Pakistanis' administrative abilities were just mediocre-always been" were the remarks by the ex-General and Information Minister of Yahya (Pataudi, 1978). The written accounts by Pakistani generals indicate the fringe nature of support for East Pakistan separation (Mitha, 2003) but the point remains that with 56 % turnout and Awami league grabbing majority of votes, 42 percent of population eligible population did vote for six points (Bose, 2011). Civil war also created a refugee crisis and the estimates vary but millions fled to India (Jaffrelot, 2002).

The civil war, Indo-Pak war are beyond the scope of this work but the facts remain that the situation of East Pakistan could not have been saved when the entire Bengali forces as part of Pakistan Army mutinied which no one anticipated or expected (Nawaz, 2008): Any state trying to quell emergency or insurgency in a region with no representation from that region ends up being just an occupier.



The negotiation after the election were around six points but total disregard for the alternative policy options is the clear evidence of the policy bankruptcy of the state. Six points would in their true spirit were indeed untenable but these were prepared by professional economists and experts. On the other hand the six points were taken as mere slogan not put for deliberations at Planning Commission or Finance Ministry or even seen by junta (as per anecdote) or and no alternative policy proposals were presented for any meaningful negotiation (Zaheer, 1994).

7. Conclusion

East Pakistan separation was the outcome of a long process starting from dissatisfaction, assertiveness, deprivation, alienation, and resistance. It is now matter of record that despite popular calls for separation, the Awami League officially negotiated though their stance getting tougher and ultimately the operation searchlight (25th March 1971) turned resistance movement into civil war (Umar, 2004). The civil war was precipitated more by rebellion from within the armed forces then by the locals, who joined later. Civil war was also consequence of failure of months long talks marred by fear, suspicion and prejudice (Zaheer, 1994). The talks were doomed for failure and the emergency state became a state at war.

Policies do affect politics and in a big way. The political instability of 1950s led to the notion of apolitical governance system in 1960s which for a while appeared to deliver through targeted policies but the same policies created class based unrest in the west and nationalistic resistance in the East. Both the class and nationalism politics were a clear product of policies made on faulty assumptions. The economic gains at the end of day didn't matter in the face of politics and to propose the amended version of now famous American saying , It's the political-economy stupid.

Another major conclusion is the role of nature of governance in shaping politics and not the output and performance of economy. Even if one is charitable, East Pakistan didn't fare too bad in their own numbers but the real issue was faulty governance model (centralized, non-representative & imported) and the faulty policies(inequitable, partisan & captured) in the 1960s which hastened the journey from dissatisfaction to alienation and then onwards to revolt and separation. Governance and policies if not by the people and for the people, have a very short shelf life. The argument is confirmed by the findings in study "Why Nations Fail" that nations fail when institutions are extractive and not inclusive and pluralistic, protecting the political and economic power of small elite (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

The governance depends on the nature of State. Pakistani state did not pay attention to being a republic or federation. It hovered between the

administrative to autocratic and then the emergency state which was desperately and unsuccessfully trying to hold on to its territorial integrity. Little realizing that after losing people, the loss of territory is a foregone conclusion. Even now in the words of IA Rehman, the trade off between autonomy and development failed in East Pakistan and is unlikely to succeed in Balochsian and KP (Hussain D. I., 2018).

The study finds key distinction between government and public policies. The government policies did not and could not grasp the true purpose of having a public policy, that public comes before the policy and the public polices represents the public interest-in both letter and spirit. Even today, there are only government policies while the governments suffer from the same issue of rationale and focus which it did during the 1947-1971.

The study also postulates the process of national identity formulation. It starts with who you are- ethnic, how you present yourself –values, language & culture , do you have voice –freedom, how you participate in collective life – representation, and how your money is taken and spent – economy. All these form identity, which simply means what you stand for as a group with respect to other groups. The study finds that the policy and governance led to the identity formation outside of Pakistani identity through a process of dissatisfaction, deprivation, isolation and resistance.

Lastly, could the outcome be any different? Could there be any other options?

In what remains of Pakistan (West-Pakistan), the common understanding is that of fait accompli. East Pakistan had to go its separate way. Unfortunately, the separation process turned out to be bloody and tragic, but the outcomes could not have been any different. This paper does not ascribe to the fait accompli thesis and concludes that with different sets of policies and governance models, there could have been a number of scenarios.

Ideal: The ideal scenario would have a far-sighted political leadership, a participative decision- making even under the military regime, even-handed distribution of resources between the two wings with delegated administrative policy, equitable economic policy and indigenous social policy. Canada and Malaysia come to mind as examples which have managed the diversity and differences really well.

Compromise: A compromise could have been achieved with sufficient administrative and economic autonomy to the provinces. The compromise would have resulted in Pakistan being a federation instead of strong center and progressively allowed the wings to take ownership of their development and revenues thus focusing more on the revenue indicators.

Confederation: Confederation would have taken federation a step further and would have meant agreeing to the bulk of six points. This would have been no



less than surrender to the Awami league but as per them that's the mandate they got if the assembly would have been convened, the confederation could have been the only option.

Peaceful Separation: Many countries in the world have gone their separate ways, like Czechoslovakia, and its *velvet divorce* is a case study. Referendum could have been one recourse though the results of the referendum were already clear. A peaceful separation can only be achieved once its inevitability dawns on the leadership as well as the populace. This could have been possible only in democracy. Dictatorships despite having the aura of strength are really brittle when it comes to decisions like this

Civil War: Ultimately East Pakistan separated through the civil war. Millions were displaced and with varying claims thousands if not more killed. Pakistan ended up with military defeat and 90,000 prisoners of war and the event indelible impressions on the nation's psyche. The demoralized army and defeated country went on to pick the pieces but the cost was too heavy and too inhuman.

8. Recommendations

In the light of foregoing discussion and the conclusions, the recommendations can be divided into three categories.

8.1. State

Governance stems from the state. East Pakistan separation has taught this very important lesson that the State needs to have three important characteristics; Representative, Federal and Parliamentary. Pakistan state must maintain these characteristics to prevent the alienation and exclusion of smaller provinces. No unit will surrender its autonomy for development no matter how much economic benefits are promised. The likelihood of an East Pakistan-type separation is thankfully close to zero due to the weak link between politics and violence, but the link policies and politics are getting stronger through alienation, exclusion and vacuum. In fact, study has important lessons for Balochistan and Ex-FATA where perceived grievances are presented as alienation and exclusion and in response the autonomy is branded as separatism.

8.2. Governance

Governance model is the link between state and its people. We have not been able to define and tailor an appropriate governance model. The 50s and 60s governance model had three characteristics; centralised, administrative and hybrid (CAH). The CAH model needs to be replaced with DIP; decentralized, institutional and participatory. Governance needs to be as decentralized as possible. The eighteenth Amendment is thus a step in the right direction.

Governance has to move from an administrative to an institutional system. An institutional system is professional, lean and flexible. Finally, the governance should be participatory, not just between bureaucrats and politicians but even beyond that to other stakeholders.

8.3. Policy

Policy lessons are the key to this study and most takeaways are in the policy sphere. Who should make policy, how policies are made, how these are implanted and how to anticipate the intended and unintended consequences of the policies. We have seen that the policies of the 50s and 60s actually achieved their targets but still failed. Policies failed because those who made them were disconnected from the public, adverse to politics and indifferent to their consequences.

The study concludes that policies are constrained by the state and governance structure. To have different policies, different governance and a fresh perspective on the state are required. To qualify as public policies, these should be made keeping in view not just the economic but politico-economic factors. Policies should not be made in isolation and should incorporate not just technical and political realities. Political capacity building is a must for better policies. Then comes the question of capture. How to prevent the policy capture and yet make effective policies, is the question of policy makers for today.

Policy conception, implementation and review should be holistic. Policy flows from the problem definition. If the policy defines the problem regarding economic and technical issues, the policies will ignore political consequences. If, however, the policy problems are people-centric, the political consequences could be avoided. Then, policy conception suffers from severe groupthink problems. If the same kind of people and too in the hierarchy keep only consulting each other, they will never get a holistic policy. Finally, the policies should be reviewed and the lessons should be institutionalized. This study finds the role of policies in the creation of isolation and alienation leading to separation, but a detailed review, except for industrial policy, has not been done. Policies need to be reviewed for what they achieved, what they achieved wrongly and what they did not achieve at all.

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